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A Concrete Shoe for Brand X?
By David J. Shakow
The Supreme Court has decided Home Concrete1
and handed taxpayers a victory by holding that the
statute of limitations was not increased from three
to six years for taxpayers who overstated their bases
in assets.
The case involved a son-of-BOSS tax shelter that
improperly inflated the basis of assets. Under sec-
tion 6501(e)(1)(A), the statute of limitations for
assessing a deficiency against a taxpayer is ex-
tended from three to six years when she omits from
gross income an amount in excess of 25 percent of
the gross income stated on the return. The question
was whether the reduction of gross income that
results from the offset of the inflated basis against
an amount realized on a disposition of the asset
extends the statute of limitations under section
6501(e)(1)(A).
The question was complicated by two special
circumstances. First, in 1958 the Supreme Court in
Colony Inc. v. Commissioner2 interpreted identical
language in the 1939 code to mean that the ex-
tended statute of limitations did not apply. But in
2010, while Home Concrete was in litigation, the
government issued regulations stating that the ex-
tended statute applied.3
Once the regulations were issued, the Chevron4
doctrine of administrative law was called into play.
Chevron requires courts to defer to an administra-
tive interpretation of a statute unless the statute is
unambiguous (Chevron step one) or, if the statute is
ambiguous, to defer to it unless the interpretation is
not a permissible interpretation of the statute (Chev-
ron step two). In Mayo,5 decided last year, the Court
held that Chevron applies in tax cases the same way
it applies in other areas of administrative law.
Is an administrative agency constrained in its
interpretation if a court has already interpreted the
statute? In Brand X,6 decided in 2005, the Court held
that an administrative pronouncement could over-
ride a prior judicial interpretation of a statute. That
is, if the administrative pronouncement passed the
Chevron test, the administrative agency could over-
turn a judicial decision.
But Brand X has never been applied to allow an
administrative agency to overturn a decision of the
Supreme Court; perhaps such an application is too
broad. On the other hand, the Court in Colony said,
in reference to the statutory language before the
Court in that case and in Home Concrete, that ‘‘it
cannot be said that the language is unambiguous.’’
If the Supreme Court says the language is ambigu-
ous, why not allow the administrative agency to
clarify it?
Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote the opinion in
Home Concrete, with Chief Justice John G. Roberts
and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito
in agreement. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote
the dissent, with Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joining him.
Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion, concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, was the swing
vote.
1Home Concrete & Supply LLC v. United States, Sup. Ct. Dkt.
No. 11-139 (2012), Doc 2012-8781, 2012 TNT 81-11, aff’g 634 F.3d
249 (4th Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-2674, 2011 TNT 26-7.
2357 U.S. 28 (1958).
3Reg. section 301.6501(e)-1.
4Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
5Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011), Doc 2011-609, 2011 TNT 8-10.
6National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet
Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
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The majority found that because the language in
Home Concrete was identical to the language it
interpreted in Colony, the same result should apply.
It rejected the government’s argument (which the
dissenters accept) that changes made to related
sections of the statute in 1954 require a reconsidera-
tion of the meaning of the language before the
Court. In addition, it refused to defer to the regula-
tions the IRS finalized in 2010. Breyer argues that in
this context, once the Court interprets the statute,
there is no other interpretation available for adop-
tion by the agency. In explaining why Brand X does
not apply, Breyer does not necessarily give special
deference to every Supreme Court opinion. Instead,
he interprets Brand X to mean that deference is to be
given to an administrative interpretation only when
there is evidence that Congress delegated gap-
filling authority to an agency.
Thus, we are to understand Chevron step one (is
the language unambiguous?) simply as an example
of a situation when Congress clearly did not del-
egate gap-filling authority to the agency.7 But even
if the language is ambiguous, the agency apparently
can’t act unless there is an indication that Congress
intended that it exercise its gap-filling authority.
And in what might be the most novel point of
Breyer’s opinion, he quotes Chevron to the effect
that ‘‘if a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an inten-
tion on the precise question at issue, that intention
is the law and must be given effect.’’8 In other
words, it would appear that if ‘‘traditional tools of
statutory construction’’ result in one interpretation
of a statute,9 there is no room for an administrative
agency to take a contrary position. If that is the law,
it would seem to significantly limit the role of
Chevron and, even more so, Brand X.
Note that while that could be the most novel
point in Breyer’s opinion, it is not the most novel
point of the majority. The section of the opinion in
which that discussion is found was the part in
which Scalia did not join, thus making it the posi-
tion of only Breyer and the three Justices who
accepted all of his opinion. But Scalia did not
disagree with that discussion because he believed it
went too far; instead, as the dissenter in Brand X, he
believes that any court decision prevents an admin-
istrative agency from thereafter requiring that court
to interpret the statute otherwise. In other words, if
the Third Circuit decides to interpret a statute in a
particular way, any contrary interpretation from the
administrative agency is properly ignored by the
Third Circuit.10
Scalia characterized Breyer’s position to be that if
a pre-Chevron holding concludes that a statute is
ambiguous, the court must also have found ‘‘that
Congress wanted the particular ambiguity in question
to be resolved by the agency’’11 if the agency is to
invoke its Brand X ‘‘gap-filling’’ power. Presumably,
the reason Scalia limits that approach to pre-Chevron
decisions is that if a court after Chevron character-
izes a statute as ambiguous, it is inviting an agency
to supply any permissible interpretation in accor-
dance with Chevron. But Scalia is not clear on that
proposition: Perhaps he would extend the argu-
ment to post-Chevron cases, too.
As for the dissenters, they take the position that
the changes made in 1954 should have put tax-
payers on notice that the language interpreted in
Colony was subject to reinterpretation. Thus, in the
absence of any authoritative interpretation of sec-
tion 6501(e)(1)(A), the government was free to in-
terpret it as it chose. Under that view, the case
before the Court did not raise the delicate question
whether Brand X (under which an administrative
agency can overturn a judicial interpretation of a
statute) would apply even to a decision of the
Supreme Court.12 Because the dissenters argued
that the changes made in 1954 necessarily left the
language of section 6501(e)(1)(A) ambiguous, it was
open for the IRS to interpret it anew without any
constraint from the Court’s decision in Colony.
The continuing significance of Home Concrete is
unclear. The Court’s decision certainly means that
reg. section 301.6501(e)-1, as amended in 2010, is
invalid to the extent it conflicts with Colony. The
more important question is whether the Court has
further undermined the rickety Chevron structure.13
Breyer suggests that any administrative agency’s
attempt to use Brand X logic to overturn a pre-
Chevron decision now faces an additional hurdle.7Slip op. at 9.
8Slip op. at 10 (emphasis in original). It is interesting that
after reviewing the analysis in Colony, Breyer said, ‘‘It may be
that judges today would use other methods to determine
whether Congress left a gap to fill.’’ That leaves yet another area
for observers to argue about the precise scope of Breyer’s
approach.
9That the Court in Colony said the statutory language is ‘‘not
unambiguous’’ is irrelevant, because the Court there was not
speaking in the context of Chevron (which had not yet been
decided). Instead, the fact that the Court in Colony interpreted
the statute in a particular way meant that any lurking ambiguity
is irrelevant for Chevron purposes. Slip op. at 10.
10Although Scalia is not clear on that point, his argument
does not seem to be limited to decisions of the Supreme Court.
As he said in his Brand X dissent, ‘‘When a court interprets a
statute . . . its interpretation . . . is the law.’’ 545 U.S. at 1019.
11Scalia concurrence, slip op. at 3 (emphasis in original).
12See Kennedy dissent, slip op. at 6.
13I discussed the uncertain state of Chevron jurisprudence in
‘‘Who’s Afraid of the APA?’’ Tax Notes, Feb. 13, 2012, p. 825, Doc
2011-27082, or 2012 TNT 30-11.
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The agency would apparently now have to show
that Congress delegated gap-filling authority in that
circumstance. Presumably, Scalia would sign on to
that position, although it is more limited than his
approach.
But the logic of Breyer’s opinion in Home Concrete
suggests that administrative actions taken to over-
turn a post-Chevron opinion may also face that
additional hurdle. If a court opinion does not ex-
plicitly indicate that a statute is ambiguous for
Chevron purposes, would Breyer insist that a court
must determine whether a statute effectively del-
egates to an agency the power to fill a gap? The
logic of his opinion suggests that he would. But
would a majority of the Court go along with that
approach?
It looks like tax practitioners, like other adminis-
trative law practitioners, will have to return to the
Supreme Court for more guidance. Tax practitioners
— welcome to the wonderful world of Chevron.
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